Over the past months, the case for currency convertibility in most current account transactions appears to have been won in all the smaller nations of Central and Eastern Europe.`It has been accepted that convertibility will help to bring a distorted domestic relative price structure more in line with world prices. The substitution eftects both in production and consumption that are activated by the move to convertibility of the currency will be helpful in the transition to a market economy. But, to impose domestic relative prices that are more in agreement with world market conditions will inilially impose heavy adjustment costs on consumers and produccrs. The benefits of more realistic prices do not appear immediately; the costs of reduced subsidies to consumers and producers hurt directly. For that reason alone, removal of distortions in relative prices will stimulate strong political opposition from consumers, workers and managers. A very important advantage of currency convertibility is that the speed with which domestic relative prices adjust to conditions in the world market depends less on domestic political conditions, but is to an extent imposed from abroad.
The other argument from political economy in favor of immediale convertibility on current account is that the absence of an`economic' market for foreign exchange implies the continued existence of a political market in which foreign currency receipts are collected from companies and allocated to companies (and individuals). Some (small, newly established) companies may have attractive investment projects but fail to obtain foreign exchange for vital imports of machinery, as other (large) businesses enjoy the political 'See Gcnberg (1990) for a clear analysis why it makes no sense in the case of the ez-socialist nations to demand that macrceconomic stabílization is achieved before the step to a convcrtible currency is taken. See also Greeno and Isard (1991) for a thorough survey of the arguments for and against quick establishment of convertibility.
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connections that are essential to obtaining foreign exchange. In addition, firms and individuals will have strong incentives to maintain foreign currency balances abroad where they cannot be subjected to confiscation or forced exchange into domestic money at an exchange rate less favourable than the b!ack market rate. Maintaining administrative control over the foreign exchange market will perpetuate an uncertain and inefficient set of constraints on firms' activities and cause allocative distortions to spread from the foreign exchange market to the domestic goods and credit markets.2
Fixed excl~ange rates or a crswling peg?
Many economists have advocated some form of fixed exchange rates for the Central and Eastern European nations. Prescriptions vary from Allan H. Meltzer's1 advocacy of a monetary authority for the Soviet Union along the lines of the Hong Kong example to proposals to strive towards participation in the European Monetary System near the end of this decade. A fixed exchange rate has also been advocated as part of a fiscal-monetary package to break (incipient) hyper-inllation.
Fixing the exchange rate of a bankrupt economy without substantial gross international reserves will result in an exchange rate that should deliver almost instantaneous equilibrium on current account. That exchange rate will -unavoidably -be severely undervalued by any purchasing power parity consideration. The actual value of the real exchange rate, however, will depend, ceteris paribus, on the emphasis the authorities put on maintaining the fixed exchange rate. The longer the period for which the authorities aim to continue a particular exchange rate, the lower the exchange rate will move in the black market just before being fixed by the authorities at that black market rate. For, the markets will assume continued domestic inflation as price reform takes place and monetary overhang is reduced. Also, political pressure during the period of fixation of the exchange rate may lead to nominal wage increases in the govcrnment sector in order to temporarily lower the speed of decline in real wages. Finally, fiscal reforms may fail and the government may have to print money to cover part of its deficit. In order to maintain a low probability of an imminent devaluation throughout such a period, the exchange rate must be so low that initially international reserves will be accumulated through current account surpluses. This, in fact, is what happened in the Polish case.
An extremely low exchange rate may indeed achieve credibility that it will be maintained for a protracted period. That by itself does not deliver a nominal anchor to the economy: in Poland in(lation continued at a 100 2Calvo and Frenkel 11991) usefully analyse the diflicultics in developing credit markets in exsocialist nations during the transition lo a market economy. 'See Meltzer (1990) , see also Bofinger (1991I and BomholT ( t991I for a critique. 
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pe:rcent annual rate after the initial 80 percent jump in average prices after the currency reform. A long-term fixing o( lhc exchange ratc has significant costs, as the ablest workers contemplate migration, given the extreme disparity between domestic and foreign wage levels. With a crawling pegfixing the exchange rate for briefer periods -the exchange rate will be able to depreciate as necessary, avoiding the need for an initial value that is as low as in the recent Polish case.T he standard objection to a crawling peg as initial exchange rate system for the ex-socialist nations is that the economy then needs to derive its nominal anchor from its own domestic monetary target, but that the demand for money schedule is too uncertain to make this feasible during the transition to a market economy: monetary overhang, future price reform, uncertain trends in real income and wealth, uncertain returns on money substitutes. The objection secros valid, but there is an alternative. With most workers employed by the'state, setting a path for nominal wages in the state sector during the initial period of the rcforms will deliver something akin to nominal income targeting. This in fact is what the Dutch finance minister, Pieter Lieftinck, did during the first 6 months after the Dutch currency reform of July 1945: the government exccuted a wage policy and lhe Central Bank was instructed to increase the money supply accordingly.s In December 1945, the monetary overhang had been removed, real income could be estimated with more accuracy lhan directly after the war, and the Central Bank moved successfully to a standard monetary policy of steering a monetary aggregatc.
h1onetary reform in the Soviet Union
Two factors make it even more difficult to ofTer some suggestions about the Soviet Union than to consider the smallcr nations of Central and Eastern Europe. First, potential conflicts betwcen different nationalities create the real risk of territoria) contlicts between the different republics, perhaps espccially in lhc smaller Asian republics where population pressures cause incompatible demands for scarce water resources. Second, uncertainty about fiscal policy is an order of magnitude greater than in the smaller countries of Central Europe: tax rcvenucs are collected at the republican levcl, but military expenditures and much of thc bureaucracy is currently financed through 'Poland exemplifies the anempt to achieve a credible fix of the ezchange rate for a long period. See Portes (1991) for analysis of lhe cosls of an excessive imlial devalualion as in lhe Polish case. Asselain I1991) wriles: 'the level of thc exchange rate may be considcred a weak poinl of Ihe (Pulah) plrn adopted in autumn 19g9. ' 'See Lieftinck (197)): BomholT ( 1991) pafxr summarizes lhis episode.
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the centre.b The chaotic situation in the fiscal area and large differences in per capita wealth imply that each different republic is going to implement its own tax system. This is not to be regretted, as the traditional Hayekian argument applies that trying different systems during the difficult transition to a market economy may make more sense than imposing a single system of taxation from above. If a single monetary authority tries to serve all republics and at the same time the republics implement separate fiscal policies, how will such a common monetary authority implement a monetary reform to end the current hyperin(lation? Centrifugal political forces will make it difiicult if not impossible to negotiate the amount of seigniorage to be collected by a single monetary authority for the Soviet Union, let alone its division over the different republics. More fundamentally, a monetary reform makes little sense unless future budget deficits can be covered without recourse to excessive money creation.' However, the underlying fiscal reforms that are necessary for a successful monetary reform depend on developmerits in the individual republics, and these will not be coordinated between the republics but depend on political conditions in each republic. Under these circumstances the republics will prefer to maintain monetary autonomy including the right to alter the exchange rate with the other republics. The total amount of seigniorage may be less if each republic introduces its own money, because foreign currency may become even more important for trans-border trade, but each republic will have full rights over its own revenues from the creation of money. lf the world community sees negative externalities here, that would be an argument for fiscal assistance to the republics.e
Prices will have to be liberalized throughout the Soviet Union and real wages must adapt, but political conditions in each republic will dictate the speed with which the required decline in real wage costs can be implemented. Political conditions in some republics will be morc conducive to a rapid fall in real wage costs; other republics will feel obliged-to move more slowly and such differences in the speed with which price reform and privatization take place will have consequences in the ftscal area. Not only will the republics not be able to agree on a common monetary policy, they will not want to give up the exchange rate as an instrument for macroeconomic adjustment.
In the meantime, one has to hope that real activity in each republic will not be disadvantaged by the introduction of separate monies in the republics and that republics will not be tempted to impose costly restrictions on "This chaotic state of affairs makes it impossible to produce an aggregate cstimate of the current budget deficit for thc Soviet Union. A number of 2S Perccnt of GDP has been mentioned.
'Bruno (1991) dcscribes how Israel and some Latin American countries lost thcir nominal anchors because of fiscel imhalances in conjunction with (partial) wage indezation.
"Scc Solimano (1991) for an analysis of fiscal assistance by thc league of nations to Cenlral and Eastcrn Europc in the intcrwar period.
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interrepublican trade. Transaction costs will unavoidably increase temporarily as economic agents have to learn to use new monies without a reputation or a record, and to assess the costs and be:nefits of trading in domestie money or in hard currency. Resolution of the uncertainties that Iead to highcr transactions costs will depend, as always, on fiscal developments, bccausc thcrc ncvcr will be a stable monctary policy without a sustainable fiscal policy. No. 14 A. Hoque, J.R. Magrtus and B. Pesaran, The exact multi-period mean-square forecast error tor the f'ust-order autoregressive model, Jounut! of Econometrics, vol. 39, no. 3, 1988, pp. 327 -346. No No. 18 T. Wansbeek and A. Kapteyn, Estimation ot the error-components model with incomplete panels, Jouma! oj Econometncs, vol. 41, no. 3, 1989, pp. 341 -36t. No. 19 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman end R. Willemse, Some methodological issues in the implementation of subjective poverty deCutitions, The Jouma! oj Human Resources, vol. 23, no. 2, 1988, pp. 222 -242. No. 20 Th. van de Klundert and F. van der Plceg, Fiscal policy and f'utite lives in interdependent economies with real and nominal wage riydity, Osjord Economic Papers, vol. 41, no. 3, 1989, pp. 459 -489. No. 2l J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran, The exact multi-period mean-square torecast error tor the Ctrst-order autoregressive mode! with an intercept, Joutnal oj Econometricr, vol. 42, no. 2, 1989, pp. 157 -179. No. 22 F. van der Plceg, Two essays on political ewnomy: (i) The political economy of overvaluation, The Ecottomic Journal, vol. 99, no. 397, 1989, pp. 850 -855; (ii) Election outcomes and the stockmarket, European Jouma! ojPoliticaJEconotny, vol. 3, no. 1, 1989, pp. 21 -30. No. 23 J.R. Magnus and A.D. Woodland, On the maximum likelihood estimation of multivariate regression models containing serially correlated error components, lntemational Economic Review, vol. 29, no. 4, 1988, pp. 707 -725. No 
